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Tuberculosis (TB) is a major burden in South 
Africa (SA), and prevalence rates in the Western 
Cape Province are exceptionally high. In 2010, 
TB was the second leading cause of male deaths 
after interpersonal violence, with the burden of TB 
highest in the younger population, contributing to a large number 
of early deaths.[1] The most significant change in disease burden in 
recent years is the simultaneous increase in comorbid HIV infection 
and the rise of multidrug-resistant (MDR) TB. The challenge 
over the coming years will be to prevent hospitals from becoming 
sources of nosocomial infections for both healthcare workers and 
patients.[2]
The Western Cape Government healthcare strategy up to 
2030[2] states that ‘All acute admitting institutions must have 
appropriate infection control measures to the extent that they 
would be comfortable to retain a drug-resistant case for 24 to 
72 hours …’.
To be confident in managing acute presentations of pulmonary 
tuberculosis (PTB) at a facility level, the infection prevention and 
control (IPC) measures used in the hospital must be of a high 
standard. IPC measures for use in low-resource settings have 
been published by both the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC).[3,4] Infection 
control is divided into three areas: administrative, environmental, 
and personal protective equipment. Studies looking at the 
implementation of infection control in SA at facilities ranging 
from primary healthcare facilities to specialist centres for MDR 
TB have found that practice between practitioners and facilities is 
highly variable.[5-7]
Research carried out in low- and middle-income countries has shown 
that healthcare workers are at considerable risk of contracting TB in 
high-risk settings through nosocomial transmission.[8] Studies in SA 
have shown a high rate of TB among healthcare workers in settings 
ranging from primary healthcare facilities to tertiary teaching 
hospitals.[6,9] This includes a high rate of conversion to latent TB 
infection by medical students and practising healthcare workers.[10]
In high-income settings the emergency centre (EC) has been 
shown to be a high-risk area owing to presentation of patients 
with undiagnosed TB, slow diagnosis of their TB, and failure to 
isolate them appropriately.[11,12] Efforts have been made to improve 
infection control procedures to try to reduce the risk of nosocomial 
spread of TB within the EC.[11,13] A search using Ovid Medline did 
not find any comparable work from SA.
Motivation
George Regional Hospital (GRH) is a 272-bed regional referral 
hospital for the Eden and Central Karoo districts of the Western 
Cape, covering a mixed urban and rural population of 500 000 
people. The Western Cape is an area with a high prevalence of TB. 
The GRH EC is the only public healthcare facility in the George 
district that provides a 24-hour service, with approximately 3 200 
attendances a month. The perception among EC staff is that a high 
burden of PTB is being diagnosed and infection control procedures 
are lacking, resulting in a high risk of nosocomial transmission. 
Our literature search found that while there has been research in SA 
looking at the risk of nosocomial transmission of TB, none has been 
carried out in the setting of the EC, identified internationally as a 
high-risk area.
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Background. George Regional Hospital (GRH) is a 272-bed regional referral hospital for the Eden and Central Karoo districts, Western 
Cape Province, South Africa. The perception among emergency centre (EC) staff is that a high burden of tuberculosis (TB) is being 
diagnosed and that infection control procedures are currently lacking, leading to a high risk of nosocomial transmission.
Objectives. To establish the burden of pulmonary TB (PTB) presenting to GRH via the EC and audit current infection prevention and 
control practices, to quantify the risk of transmission of PTB in the EC and to establish whether infection control measures are inadequate.
Methods. An audit of infection control based on the Centers for Disease Control audit tool for TB, analysis of results, and implementation 
of new infection control measures including a new standard operating procedure based on a set of triage criteria.
Results. Implementation of new triage criteria and a standard operating procedure led to the longest length of stay of a patient with 
suspected TB in the EC being reduced by 40% (from 142 hours to 84 hours). The average time between seeing a doctor and leaving the EC 
for patients with suspected TB was reduced by 20% (from 20 hours 40 minutes to 16 hours 45 minutes).
Conclusion. Simple measures implemented in the EC led to a significant reduction in the time patients with suspected or confirmed TB 
spent in the EC. This should lead to a reduced risk of nosocomial transmission of TB to both staff and patients.
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Objectives
To focus on establishing the burden of PTB 
presenting to GRH via the EC and then 
auditing current IPC practice regarding 
patients with PTB (using the CDC audit 
tool[3] as a guide). This would confirm 
whether the EC is a high-risk environment 
for the transmission of PTB, as demonstrated 
in high-income countries, and assess the 
adequacy of current IPC policy to prevent 
transmission. If this was found to be 
inadequate, simple IPC measures as outlined 
in the WHO policy could be implemented 
with a view to undertaking a re-audit to 
determine whether IPC had improved.
Ethical approval was granted by the 
Stellenbosch University Health Research and 
Ethics Committee 2 on 3 December 2014 
(protocol No. N14/10/153).
Methods and discussion
Phase 1: Baseline assessment
National data from the National Health 
Laboratory Service[14] showing the number 
of patients diagnosed with TB on Xpert 
MTB/RIF were used to calculate the burden 
of PTB in the EC and relate this to the burden 
in the George and Eden districts. According 
to these data, 20% of PTB diagnosed in the 
George District is at GRH; this constitutes 
7% of PTB diagnosed in the Eden District 
(Table 1).
A cohort of patients was then created using 
the monthly facility alert organism report 
and International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th 
revision (ICD-10) coding from the monthly 
GRH Outpatient Department Appointment 
Clinicom data spreadsheet. This included: 
(i) all patients with a positive Xpert MTB/
RIF assay test for Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
(MTB); (ii) all patients with a positive 
finding on direct sputum microscopy for 
acid-fast bacilli; and (iii) all patients with an 
ICD-10 code that correlates with a diagnosis 
of TB (A15-19), and excluded: (i) patients 
who on review of clinical records were not 
seen in the EC; and (ii) patients who were 
incorrectly coded and did not have PTB.
A cohort of 102 patients was created using 
data from August and September 2014, of 
whom 81 had confirmed TB. Five of these 
patients had drug-resistant TB, and 40% 
had attended the hospital in the previous 6 
months.
Data on IPC in the EC were then 
collected for 1 week on the twice-daily ward 
rounds. For each patient with suspected or 
confirmed PTB, the IPC measures in place 
were assessed. It was found that there were 
32 patient encounters in 1 week: 22% of 
patients were in an isolation room, 66% 
were in an open bay but wearing a surgical 
mask, and 12% had no IPC measures in 
place. Only the patients in the isolation 
room had any signage identifying them as 
requiring IPC measures. Of these patients, 
35% were positive on Xpert MTB/RIF assay, 
confirming the suspicion that high numbers 
of patients with PTB are in the EC on a daily 
basis with no infection control measures in 
place.
Based on the CDC infection control 
audit tool,[3] a full audit of administrative, 
environmental and personal protective 
measures in the EC was carried out. This 
included a review of all records of 102 adult 
patients with suspected TB in the EC to 
determine patient flow and reasons for delay.
The key issues identified were: (i) poor 
flow to discharge through the EC, especially 
after initial review by a doctor (see Table 3); 
Table 1. Positive Xpert MTB/RIF assay results as a proportion of all assays sent
Results of Xpert MTB/RIF assays sent in a 
4-month period
Location Total number sent Positive results, n (%)
George Regional Hospital 477 102 (21.4)
George District 3 350 506 (15.1)
Eden District 9 288 1 371 (14.7)
Western Cape 73 575 11 319 (15.4)
Comparative hospitals    
Worcester 467 117 (25.1)















































Assessment	  by	  doctor:	  
Patient	  has	  suspected	  TB	  
Does	  the	  patient	  meet	  any	  of	  these	  criteria?	  
1.	  Triaged	  on	  arrival	  as	  mobilising	  with	  help/stretcher	  
2.	  	  Chest	  drain	  required	  
3.	  	  Significant	  haemoptysis	  
4.	  	  Significant	  comorbidity,	  e.g.	  severe	  lung	  disease,	  electrolyte	  
disturbance,	  hyperglycaemia	  
5.	  	  Compliance	  issues	  and	  won't	  be	  able	  to	  complete	  treatment	  
in	  community,	  e.g.	  defaulted	  treatment,	  language	  issues,	  social	  
barriers	  
Yes	   No	  
Isolate	  patient	  in	  the	  EC	  
Complete	  investigations	  and	  treatment	  
as	  necessary	  
Reassess	  using	  criteria	  once	  results	  





Patient	  can	  go	  home	  
Fill	  in	  TB	  discharge	  summary:	  
1. Copy	  for	  patient	  
2. Email	  copy	  to	  clinic	  and	  HAST	  
3. Copy	  for	  notes	  
Patient	  to	  go	  outside	  and	  produce	  sputum	  
sample	  for	  Xpert	  MTB/RIF	  and	  direct	  
microscopy	  
Send	  Xpert	  MTB/RIF	  marked	  as	  ROUTINE	  
Patient	  can	  be	  discharged	  and	  followed	  up	  
at	  clinic	  
	  
Patient	  needs	  admission	  
Refer	  to	  internal	  medicine	  or	  family	  medicine	  
for	  urgent	  admission	  
Patient	  to	  be	  admitted	  to	  available	  side-­‐
room/isolation	  room	  on	  ward	  
	  
Send	  Xpert	  MTB/RIF	  marked	  as	  URGENT	  and	  
call	  through	  to	  laboratory	  staff	  
Family	  medicine/internal	  medicine	  wards	  
Isolation	  criteria:	  
• Patients	  who	  need	  admission	  should	  be	  
immediately	  isolated	  in	  a	  single	  room	  	  
• If	  the	  patient	  is	  found	  to	  have	  rifampicin-­‐sensitive	  
MTB	  on	  Xpert	  MTB/RIF,	  they	  can	  then	  be	  moved	  
into	  a	  drug-­‐sensitive	  TB	  bay	  
• All	  MDR/XDR	  TB	  should	  remain	  in	  single	  rooms	  	  
• Xpert	  MTB/RIF	  negative	  patients	  can	  be	  moved	  
out	  of	  isolation	  
Treat	  patient	  in	  ward	  
Aim	  for	  discharge	  to	  Harry	  Comay	  (TB)	  Hospital	  or	  home	  
On	  discharge,	  fill	  in	  TB	  discharge	  summary:	  
1. Copy	  for	  patient	  
2. Email	  copy	  to	  clinic/Harry	  Comay	  and	  HAST	  
3. Copy	  for	  notes	  
	  
Fig. 1. SOP for patients with PTB.
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(ii) delay in waiting for Xpert MTB/RIF assay 
results that meant patients were waiting 
longer in the department for a definite 
diagnosis; (iii) no knowledge of how the 
airflow systems in the EC worked or whether 
they worked correctly; and (iv) masks being 
worn incorrectly by staff of all grades.
Phase 2: Interventions
Improving patient flow
The baseline data were reviewed to deter-
mine which patients stayed overnight in 
the EC, were admitted, or were discharged 
to an outpatient clinic. It was found that 
the standard SA triage scale[15] used in the 
EC was not a good predictor of admission 
in this group of patients. Although patients 
were triaged red, often with a high triage 
early warning score, owing to the chronic 
nature of their infection they were typically 
well compensated and not clinically acutely 
unwell. A set of criteria were designed that 
could be used by doctors when first seeing 
a patient to assess whether the patient 
needed referral or could be discharged 
(Fig. 1).
Once these criteria were finalised, a new 
standard operating procedure (SOP) for 
patients with suspected PTB in the EC was 
designed (Fig. 1). The aim was to provide 
criteria for patients needing admission and 
a protocol for their isolation and referral. 
If a patient did not need to be admitted, 
a separate protocol to facilitate a speedy 
discharge from the EC was drawn up. A 
shortage of isolation rooms in the hospital 
was identified, especially in the internal and 
family medicine wards. A system to allow 
cohort isolation of patients with TB was 
incorporated into the SOP to try to improve 
the flow of patients and avoid blockage 
of isolation rooms by long-staying patients 
with confirmed TB.
The delay in sputum Xpert MTB/RIF assay 
results was also addressed. It was decided 
that if a patient clearly needed admission, 
whether he/she had confirmed PTB based 
on sputum Xpert MTB/RIF or not, referral 
should take place and the results of Xpert 
MTB/RIF were not needed to determine 
admission. It was agreed that sputum Xpert 
MTB/RIF assay tests for patients who were 
being admitted to the hospital (those in 
which the results would affect decisions on 
isolation) could be marked as ‘urgent’, and 
the laboratory staff could be requested by 
phone to run the test on the next batch as 
a priority.
This pathway was agreed upon by 
consultant staff in internal, family and 
emergency medicine and then presented to 
the junior staff in all departments before 
implementation. The policy was approved by 
hospital management for use and uploaded 
to the Electronic Capture Medium (ECM) 
system. It was also made available as a 
physical copy in the EC for ease of reference, 
and in the intern handbook.
Improving communication with  
primary care
A need was identified by staff working in the 
EC, and also the staff working in the Harry 
Comay (TB) Hospital and clinics (which 
receive many of the discharged patients), 
to have a standard discharge summary for 
patients with TB that contained the key 
information required and was quick to fill 
in/read. It was also identified that there was 
no safety net for patients once discharged 
from the EC if they did not present to a 
clinic.
In consultation with clinical staff in the 
hospital and colleagues at Harry Comay 
Hospital, a new discharge summary 
template was created. This could be filled 
in electronically or printed, and options 
were given for key information that could be 
deleted as appropriate to decrease the time 
needed to fill it in. It was revised according 
to feedback from all staff and then made 
available on the ECM computer system for 
use.
To increase the ease of communication 
and provide a ‘safety net’, an email system 
was created. A generic email was made 
available through the Outlook Web App on 
all computers in the EC and in the family 
medicine and internal medicine wards. The 
email address book was populated with 
email addresses for each primary healthcare 
clinic, Harry Comay Hospital and the HAST 
(HIV, sexually transmitted infections, TB) 
co-ordinator. This email was then used to 
send discharge summaries in real time to the 
clinic where the patient was to be followed 
up, allowing the nursing staff to trace any 
patient who failed to arrive. Training was 
given to all staff in the EC and instructions 
were made available on the computers.
Improving the use of N95 masks
A teaching session was designed and 
delivered to the EC staff on correct use of 
N95 masks. A poster with key information 
on it was also designed and printed in the 
EC handbook and made available in the EC 
as a reminder.
Table 2. Number of hours spent in the department by patients with suspected/
confirmed TB
Length of stay (hours)
 0 - 6 6 - 12 12 - 24 24 - 48 48 - 72 >72 >96 
August/September, % 23 27 18 17 9 2 3
December/January, % 27 24 23 18 6 3 0
Table 3. Times spent in the EC, comparing pre- and post-phase 2 interventions
August/September December/January 
Arrival to triage
Mean 1 h 3 min 59 min 
Median 45 min 31 min
Range 0 - 5 h 0 - 8 h 
Total 100 h 34 min 63 h 29 min
Triage to doctor
Mean 2 h 1 h 40 min 
Median 1 h 30 min 1 h 10 min
Range 10 min - 8 h 50 min 0 - 7 h 
Total 197 h 122 h - 56 min
Doctor to leaving EC
Mean 20 h 40 min 16 h 45 min 
Range 1 h 50 min - 142 h 
30 min 
1 h 5 min - 83 h 
51 min 
Total 1 875 h 1 226 h
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Updating infection control policy
The infection control policy for TB at GRH was updated to reflect 
current knowledge and include the new protocols in the EC. This was 
approved by the quality assurance manager and accepted officially in 
the hospital.
Phase 3: Reassessment
Using the same method as outlined in the baseline assessment, 
the flow of patients through the EC was re-audited to determine 
whether there had been a change following implementation of 
the new policy. Patients seen in December 2014 and early January 
2015 were selected using the same criteria as outlined in baseline 
assessment.
The longest length of stay of a patient was reduced by 40% (from 
142 to 84 hours), and the average time between seeing a doctor and 
leaving the EC was 20% shorter (Tables 2 and 3). On reassessment 
of patient records, it was clear that there had been a reduction in the 
time patients with PTB spent in the EC. There was a much higher 
awareness and understanding among staff of the risk of TB and the 
preventive measures to be taken, including swift identification on 
ward rounds of patients needing to be moved into isolation and those 
for whom early discharge was appropriate.
Conclusion
The implementation of simple measures in assessment and 
management of patients with suspected TB in the EC significantly 
reduced the length of patient stay. This potentially reduces the risk 
of transmission of TB to both staff and patients. The data collected 
in the reassessment phase included the festive period and yearly staff 
changeover, both extremely busy times of year in the EC. If reassessed 
again in a few months, the length of stay may decrease even further. 
Further improvements, e.g. creation of a sputum collection room 
and regular assessment of the ventilation system in the EC, would 
probably further decrease the infection risk in the EC and will be 
studied in the near future.
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